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A B S T R A C T
This paper presents a methodology for advanced extraction of data from embedded devices such as Internet
routers. The use of different access techniques are considered, in order to gain access to device memory memory,
and an investigative methodology is proposed. Lessons learnt from “hardware hacking” are considered and
presented. Preparatory steps are discussed to maximise efficiency and likelihood of success for data acquisition.
At scene actions and practice are discussed. The results show that, under the right circumstances, a full ‘file-
system’ and a full 'physical' acquisition of the device’s internal flash memory can be achieved. That this data can
be decoded and extracted into a format which may subsequently be examined in industry-standard digital
forensic tools is also presented and explored.
1. Introduction
The world of technology is ever-changing. The Internet has allowed
for the use of millions, if not billions of connected devices by con-
sumers, businesses, and industry. We exist in a world where almost
anything and everything is now “smart” and “connected”. Specialist,
embedded devices exist, with dedicated functionality. These devices are
common to almost all potential crime scenes, primarily in the form of
an Internet router, but also in many other forms, often referred to as the
Internet-of-Things (IoT). Such “embedded devices” often contain data
storage which may be useful in a digital forensic investigation.
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) defines IoT as “a
global infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced
services by interconnecting (physical and virtual) things based on ex-
isting and evolving interoperable information and communication tech-
nologies” [1]. In Mukhopadhyay et al. [2], IoT is defined as “embedded
devices (things) with Internet connectivity”, and it is stated that “IoT has
the potential to replace people as the largest consumer and producer of
information”. This is an ongoing process; the prediction of which been
supported further by others. For instance, Miessler [3] notes and predicts
a number of ways in which he believes IoT will change, and change how
we as humans live. One key prediction Miessler makes is that data will
become more open and readily available.
IoT has brought us a huge number of specialist embedded devices. An
embedded device or system is defined by Heath [4] as “a microprocessor-
based system that is built to control a function or range of functions and
is not designed to be programmed by the end user in the same way that a
PC is”. However, the reality is that whilst they are not designed to be
programmed by the end user; they must, by definition, be programmable
in order for the developer and manufacturer to make them in the first
place. The capability to do so is therefore obfuscated, but still present.
IoT can be loosely thought of as any specialist-function device which
contains memory storage and communicates with other devices via a
network or the Internet. Indeed, to quote the Wired [5] article What is
the Internet of Things?; “from hairbrushes to scales, consumer and in-
dustrial devices are having chips inserted into them to collect and
communicate data”. These devices typically have a mainboard present,
which runs an operating system. According to the Fraunhofer Institute
[6] the vast majority of these are based on Linux.
The data these devices collect has the potential to be useful in ways
the manufacturers and developers never imagined. From heart-rate data
from a fitness smart-watch helping to support or indeed refute an alibi,
to a mobile phone’s GPS putting someone in a given location at a
specific time, or even records from a home network router providing
intelligence as to which devices are currently connected to it, these
capabilities are varied and have significant potential to help solve
crimes. All such devices must, by definition, contain some form of in-
ternal memory. It is common for users to interact with these devices
through a specialist interface, application or, in the case of routers, via a
web browser-based management console interface; and the devices
themselves are generally designed in a way which prevents the user
from directly accessing the physical memory storage.
Horsman, Findlay and James [7] propose a standardised method
which can be employed by relatively unspecialised staff to extract
meaningful intelligence and evidence from routers at crime scenes. It is
therefore envisaged that this might be performed by a crime scene in-
vestigator and/or a digital media investigator, as opposed to a digital
forensic specialist. The proposed method requires direct ‘user-style’
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interaction with the device, and therefore it is to be expected that only
an incomplete dataset is obtainable. This sort of acquisition is not
carried out on all types of cases, but in fact could indeed be done as it is
reliable, easy, and inexpensive to achieve. The method proposed by
Horsman, Findlay and James [7] is designed to acquire data from
running devices at scene, however it is important to consider the fol-
lowing questions and possible limitations of such a method:
• Does this method obtain all available data that can be obtained?
• What about volatile memory and/or data sources?
• What about historic logs that may not be accessible through the
standard user interface?
• What happens to any such data when the device is removed from
power during seizure?
• What happens in a situation where the device has had its default
access password changed and the owner is not co-operative?
Horsman, Findlay and James [7] acknowledge such limitations;
their research focuses on providing the front-line officer or investigator
with a method to obtain meaningful data with minimal specialist
training or skills. We should however consider methods to overcome
such limitations, as access to greater amounts of data may be war-
ranted, especially in high-risk, high-profile or major crime investiga-
tions. Lessons can certainly be learnt from the world of cyber security,
specifically the “hardware hacking” community, in which exploitation
of such devices is carried out in the interests of making them more
secure. For digital forensic investigations, whilst the methods remain
the same; the focus shifts from exploitation and compromise, to instead
gaining access to devices with minimal footprint, for the ultimate goal
of forensically sound and comprehensive data extraction.
Cusack and Lutui [8] identify the main challenge for the collection of
data from routers, which they state to be the volatility of the data. They
do not provide a solution for direct access to the memory. This is a
problem which, as of yet, still has not been overcome. Clearly, for IoT to
be used routinely in forensic investigations, a more standardised, estab-
lished, reliable, and ultimately convenient method of access must be
developed and implemented. Likewise, previous work in the field of
cyber-security, such as that by Russell and Van Duren [9], has considered
how these devices communicate as a potential method of obtaining data.
The focus is almost exclusively on networking infrastructure, protocols,
or “stack”, rather than any physical access considerations. This situation
clearly doesn’t apply in a police-based investigation. Physical access,
either at scene, or as a result of lawful seizure; followed by laboratory-
based examination renders the possibility of physical access a near
guarantee. Therefore, other methods can and should be considered.
The work by MacDermott, Baker and Shi [10] addresses challenges
specifically associated with IoT devices, and concludes that current
digital forensic methodologies are outdated. Indeed, the most recent
copy of the ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence was published
in March 2012 (ACPO, 2012), and does not properly address the cloud,
current mobile technology, or IoT devices. Their work also acknowl-
edges that technology is changing the nature of how crime is com-
mitted. This is a view that is explored at length by Horsman [11], who
proposes a series of updates to these principles. It is clear that the di-
gital forensic industry must react and adapt to this fact.
The currently utilised standard methods for accessing router and em-
bedded device data, such as either that advocated by Horsman, Findlay and
James [7] or alternatively by means of dedicated specialist software and/or
automated collection tools, typically rely on the investigator using the de-
vice in the same way as the end-user would; and capturing logically pre-
sented data through export, screenshot or other such method. Much of the
underlying working of the device is therefore obfuscated and not accessible,
meaning that significant amounts of data (particularly deleted and historic
data) is inaccessible. This research will examine some techniques which
may be utilised to obtain more data from such devices, using techniques
which are typically associated with hardware exploitation and “hacking”.
In order to carry out a digital forensic process, one must first acquire
data to investigate. In conventional hard disc drive forensics, this is a
straightforward and well-established process; typically utilising a write-
blocker to produce an exact copy of the data stored on the storage medium.
For mobile forensics, this process is more complicated, however a good
degree of consistency and established processes still exist. For embedded
devices such as routers and IoT devices this is even less straightforward; no
standardised equipment or adapters exist which are universally recognised
and can be used on a wide variety of models or equipment. Private com-
panies and providers of forensic software, such as MSAB, Cellebrite and
HancomGMD, do offer equipment with some such capabilities; however
this equipment is often not universal (i.e. does not support a particularly
wide array of hardware), and is typically expensive and therefore might be
considered prohibitive for smaller service providers.
It is well established that the development of technology has his-
torically put functionality before security. This can be seen in the work
of Ngo, Nguyen, Le and Nguyen [12], which documents and discusses
malware for IoT devices. For the digital forensic investigator, any such
insecurity and flaws can actually be of benefit. Specifically considering
routers; a study conducted by the Fraunhofer Institute [6] noted that
none of the 127 routers they assessed were free of security flaws. Data
held on storage media within emerging technology is often unsecured,
not encrypted, and therefore accessible if physical access can be
achieved. Until such time as the manufacturer implements security and
privacy measures into their devices, the data is accessible and therefore
relatively easily used in forensic investigations. Parallels of this are well
documented in the arenas of mobile forensics and vehicle forensics.
Technology is becoming increasingly data rich. Common sources for
such data include the administration console of the device (usually
accessed via web browser from another device on the same network), a
linked cloud storage account, and a dedicated ‘app’ installed on a
smartphone. What is not currently typically considered for normal data
acquisition is the device itself. Consider for example an investigation
involving the Philips Hue system [13]. This system contains the fol-
lowing potential sources of data: a Philips cloud account, a smart-
phone/tablet app., the Bridge control unit which connects to a router,
the router at the premises, and the smart bulbs.
The typical use cases and rationale for performing these different
techniques are as follows:
1. Control of the scene/network: having a deeper access to the device
(e.g. router) may enable access in situations where the wireless key
or device admin access password is not known, and the owner is
unwilling to provide it. These methods may also allow for estab-
lishment of the administrative passwords, determination of said
passwords through other cryptographic means (e.g. cracking the
hash), bypass of the security present, and changing of credentials in
order to lock the suspect out and secure the network and/or devices
from tampering
2. Access to produce a filesystem/physical acquisition of the device
memory for subsequent “deep-dive” forensic analysis. Such acqui-
sitions will typically include user-inaccessible data, such as deleted
data and historic logs
3. Access to volatile data such as RAM on the device
Kaur and Kaur [14] further identify 4 key challenges in digital
forensic investigations. The first of these is the diversity of different
devices which may be encountered. This is a problem which has only
been compounded by the recent development and proliferation of IoT
devices. This is where examination of common hardware interfaces and
designs may prove beneficial; by identifying common designs, inter-
faces and/or software, a solution may be proposed.
Any such investigative work must of course be undertaken with due
respect to the regulatory frameworks in place within the jurisdiction. In
the case of this research, UK law enforcement must comply with the
law, the Association of Chief Police Officers guidelines [15] for digital
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evidence, the ISO/IEC 17025 standard, and also the Forensic Science
Regulator’s (FSR) Codes of Practice and Conduct [16] where applicable.
Furthermore, the FSR has indicated that ISO/IEC 17020 will also apply
to digital forensics, however the details on this are still to emerge, and
indeed the deadline of October 2020 has been deferred. International
considerations must be made by those in different jurisdictions, how-
ever general concepts regarding forensic soundness, validity of evi-
dence and sound scientific methods should all be transferrable.
Scientific frameworks exist for assessing the validity of specialist
forensic work, such as the Framework for Reliable Experimental Design
(FRED) [17]. In this work, Horsman states “To achieve this level of re-
liability, investigatory research must be suitably planned, implemented
and analysed in a way which instills confidence in the accuracy of any
findings”. Similarly, in Horsman’s Digital Evidence Reporting and Deci-
sion Support (DERDS) framework [18], it is highlighted that “it is crucial
for any practitioner to possess the ability to make reliable investigative
decisions which result in the reporting of credible evidence”. The
methodology proposed here is designed with these principles in mind,
and to provide data compatible with sound, scientific principles of in-
vestigation. Indeed, what is discussed and proposed here with regard to
access to the data fits within the Acquisition stage of the General Proce-
dural Framework aspect of Horsman’s model, and the subsequent analysis
of any extracted data can be specifically undertaken in a manner which
aligns to the Artefact-Specific aspect of said Framework.
On a practical level, thought must always be given to the validity of
any potential data extraction technique or method. Given the devices in
question are almost exclusively running a Unix/Linux operating system,
in regards competency standards and accreditation, good familiarity
with such systems is highly advised prior to attempting this work.
The aim of this methodology is to present a “forensically sound”
procedure which can be utilised to obtain a greater amount of data from
embedded devices than is currently the norm, and which can be
achieved at scene in a safe, non-destructive manner. The methodology
and techniques conducted here in this research are focused on router
devices and the subsequent network forensics which may be conducted
at-scene and highlighted relevant examples are provided using a piece
of test equipment; however it should be noted that these methods and
techniques have also been tested and shown to work on other em-
bedded devices, including smart-home lighting equipment. The process
of and responsibility for mapping this methodology into an existing
Quality Management System or scope of accreditation sits with each
organisation who intends to do this work going forward. The metho-
dology provided herein will provide guidance and a framework for
doing just that. It should also be anticipated that devices will be en-
countered for which this level of access is not possible; manufacturers
may lock down such access or remove the connectors from the main-
boards. This is simply a reality that must be accepted. Similarly, some
connectors will be obvious, and others will take time and skill to
identify; the Internet may provide a ready source of helpful information
here. Identifying non-obvious electrical components which can be used
for such connections is outside the scope of this research, and has been
well documented elsewhere.
In order to effectively acquire data from embedded devices, certain
skills and knowledge are required of the digital forensic investigator:
• A good general working knowledge of Linux operating systems and
file systems
• Familiarity with running tools and commands via the command line
in Linux; specifically, but not limited to tar, dd, netcat, cat, and cd.
• A basic understanding and knowledge of electronics, so that ap-
propriate connections (such as UART, JTAG TAPs, GPIO etc.) can be
identified and connected to. Detailed knowledge of the specifica-
tions and inner workings of such connections is not required.
In addition, the following specific software tools will be of use in
such investigations:
• Binwalk; available from https://github.com/ReFirmLabs/binwalk
• Squashfs-tools; available from https://github.com/plougher/
squashfs-tools
• Sasquatch; available from https://github.com/devttys0/sasquatch
• Jefferson; available from https://github.com/sviehb/jefferson
• Ubi-reader; available from https://github.com/jrspruitt/ubi_reader
• Yaffshiv; available from https://github.com/devttys0/yaffshiv
• MTD-Utils; available from http://www.linux-mtd.infradead.org/
source.html
It is therefore advisable that the digital forensic investigator is fa-
miliar with these tools also. It should also be noted that these tools may
be available in the inbuilt package repositories of the more mainstream
Linux distributions, making installation more straightforward. Well-
known cyber-security-oriented distributions, such as Kali Linux, and
hardware-hacking-oriented distributions, such as AttifyOS; also include
some of these tools pre-installed.
It is not anticipated that this methodology be carried out on each and
every case involving an embedded device, only those where the content
may be deemed relevant. Such examples include cases where the use of
the device may provide an alibi or account for an individual being pre-
sent at (or indeed absent from) a specific location at a certain time.
A final note for consideration is that this entire proposed metho-
dology can of course be performed in the lab, in circumstances where
the router or embedded device is seized. Whilst it is the case that some
volatile data will be lost as a result of removing power from the device
for transport, however it must also be acknowledged that these methods
will still return more data than the currently established, user-based
preview methods, and therefore they are still worth carrying out.
2. The proposed methodology
The proposed methodology for the investigation of embedded de-
vices at scene is divided into 3 stages, as follows:
1. Pre-scene preparation
2. Peri-scene investigation
3. Post-scene digital forensics
2.1. Pre-scene
Prior to attending scene, if the devices that are present are able to be
established in advance, a significant amount of useful research can be
conducted in order to prepare and choose techniques and strategies to
perform upon arrival. Useful information relating to the hardware pre-
sent in embedded devices is often freely available via the Internet. There
are a number of reliable sources for this information, including but not
limited to the FCCID database [19], the OpenWrt Project [20], and IFIXIT
teardown guides [21]. In addition to these, YouTube and Google also
provide an excellent source of information in respect to hardware tear-
downs. A stockpile of common test devices could be maintained, so that
first responders can liaise with digital forensic specialists in advance of
them attending, enabling preparatory research to be conducted. Where
there is little or no publicly available detail regarding a specific piece of
device hardware, test equipment can always be purchased from retail
suppliers in order for research to be conducted first-hand at short notice.
Whilst it is true that these devices have in common that they almost all
run on Linux, it must be recognised that different makes and models of
devices will have differences in how and where key data is stored.
Therefore it is vital that proper research and information gathering is
conducted prior to investigating a live device at a crime scene.
Device mainboards often contain access points which are intended
for developer use, but which can be exploited for digital forensic pur-
poses. With many common embedded devices, it is possible to remove
the outer cover and gain access to the mainboard whilst the device is
running. The use of techniques such as ChipOff are well established in
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lab-based digital forensics, however these techniques are destructive in
nature and not feasible at-scene. Indeed such techniques do not need to
be destructive; if the device has connections such as JTAG, GPIO, or
UART, then these can be readily exploited to gain access to the data
present on the device without damage or destruction occurring. These
connection points may be obvious, as in the case shown in Fig. 1,
however they may also not be immediately apparent, thus more de-
tailed research may be required to locate them. In some cases, devel-
opers remove these connections once a device is programmed and
configured. If this occurs, then it should be recognised that the pro-
posed methodology and procedure becomes significantly more difficult
and may in fact become impossible. As of writing, there are 1824 de-
vices in the OpenWRT database [22], of which 400 are listed as having
JTAG capabilities, 1467 as having Serial/UART capabilities, and 121
devices have some form of GPIO connection. Other methods of access
may of course also be possible, such as telnet, ssh or ftp (if supported),
however this data is not quantified here.
Consideration should also be given to obtaining information from the
device manufacturer in two ways: firstly they may be willing to co-op-
erate and provide much needed advice and guidance, and secondly their
website may provide access to firmware (in the form of downloadable
updates) which can be very useful. Firmware updates can be downloaded
and deconstructed using specialist tools; such endeavours may often
reveal hard-coded credentials such as admin passwords to access the
device, which may be able to be used in addition to any default creden-
tials which are printed on the back of the device itself. In at least one case
in conducting this research, a plaintext password was extracted from a
stock router firmware file obtained directly from the manufacturer which
provided root access to the device in question, even though the default
web admin password had been changed. In another example, the hash of
the admin password was extracted from the firmware, which could then
be subsequently cracked using password cracking software. Consideration
should also be given to downloading multiple versions of old firmware;
the author has observed passwords present in plaintext in older versions
of firmware, which have been stored in a correctly obfuscated manner in
newer versions of firmware for the same device. In this situation, the hash
of the newer version was cracked and it was found that the password was
still the same, however the point here is that older versions of the firm-
ware may provide ready access to the password without the need to resort
to cracking the hash in the newer version.
Utilisation of manufacturer-supplied firmware can be seen to comply
with Horsman’s FRED model [17], discussed earlier; as a method for safe,
non-destructive testing; and to allow an appropriate investigate strategy
to be designed, and good decision making to occur. The DERDS frame-
work [18], also discussed previously; promotes effective decision making
and advocates for thorough testing to be undertaken where required. In
Fig. 1. Image of a router mainboard with UART (Serial) connector highlighted in red (top left). OpenWrt [23]. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this
figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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the context of this research, the methodology proposed demonstrates
precisely that; thorough, repeatable and (most importantly) useful re-
search can be conducted in advance of attending a scene, which will
ultimately lead to more effective acquisition of data.
To summarise the pre-scene stage:
1. Identify the devices present in advance of arrival if possible
2. Examination of publicly available information such as mainboard
schematics/teardown guides may provide insight into connectivity
to the device, such as UART or JTAG which can be exploited to gain
access
3. Conduct research on test devices if available
4. Obtain firmware from the manufacturer. This can be used to reverse
engineer data structures, file system information, passwords, and
can provide meaningful intelligence on key files in advance.
Examine multiple versions of firmware if available
2.2. Peri-scene
At scene, having identified a method of access, this may now be
executed. Commonly available methods include making use of SSH
access over the network, establishing a Serial connection, exploiting
JTAG TAPs, and SOIC/EEPROM chip extraction.
In order to access the device via JTAG, UART, GPIO or other con-
nection, it will of course be necessary to partially disassemble the de-
vice. This can generally be achieved whilst the device is still powered,
and should be attempted this way, in order to minimise the loss of
potentially volatile data. Disassembly is usually straightforward to
achieve, and indeed, the preparatory actions undertaken during the pre-
scene stage outlined earlier will give the investigator advance knowl-
edge in order to do this quickly and effectively at-scene. At-scene this
should be no more than the work of a few seconds.
Utilisation of SSH requires nothing more than a properly prepared
forensic computer being present on the same network; a Terminal
connection is established and login credentials are presented in order to
gain access. The level of access gained through this method will depend
on the account used to log in; if indeed any credentials are required.
Establishing a Serial connection will typically allow for root access to the
device. A Serial cable is required to connect a properly prepared forensic
computer to the device. These are typically very inexpensive. Some dis-
assembly of the device is usually required for this. Linux/Unix has inbuilt
Terminal support, Windows users can make use of tools such as PuTTY to
achieve this. Hardware information printed to screen can be of use to an
investigator, as this may provide live updates regarding networked devices
connecting to and disconnecting from the device being investigated.
It should also be noted that a Serial connection is a useful source of
diagnostic information when attempting and utilising other methods of
access to such devices. It also provides meaningful information about
the device, as can be seen in Fig. 2; where the boot sequence of an
example router can be observed. This may be of use to an investigator
as it often contains relevant information, such as details of filesystem
and storage schema.
Fig. 3 shows hardware information being printed to the virtual
console of said router, and confirms that a root shell has been obtained.
JTAG is another technique which can be utilised to gain access to the
memory of embedded devices. The use of this technique in mobile for-
ensics is well documented and will therefore not be explored further here.
SOIC can be used to interface with and download data from the
EEPROM flash memory chips directly. It is used by developers to program
chips and also commonly by “hardware hackers” to extract firmware from
memory chips for vulnerability analysis. In a digital forensic context, this
method may provide a physical image level of access to the device. Access
to a logical file-system image will likely not be possible through this
technique owing to the nature of how a connection is established. It is also
the case, that live triage may not be possible, as this requires the estab-
lishment of a Terminal connection to the device whereas again, this
method is typically used to directly access the flash memory.
A number of different connections have been discussed here. As
previously discussed in the pre-scene stage of this research, appropriate
connections can be determined prior to conducting the scene work,
through research into the mainboard present within the device in
question. This work focuses on the use of UART as an example, as that is
what was present on the board of the test device shown here. UART also
has the advantage of providing a Terminal style connection for live
Fig. 2. Serial connection showing the boot sequence of a connected router.
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interaction with the device via the command line interface. Once such a
connection has been established, a number of different useful in-
telligence-based tasks can now be undertaken. These include:
• Basic filesystem navigation: the files and folders present can be ex-
plored and key files can be navigated to and examined, primarily
through the use of commands such as cat or equivalent (see Fig. 5)
• Password extraction and/or reset: the passwd and shadow files can be
extracted (via the filesystem navigation methods discussed im-
mediately above) and sent for cracking with other tools.
Alternatively the hashed credentials in the passwd and shadow files
can be replaced with the hash of a known password, to enable access
to the device. Or even more simply, it may be possible to use the
inbuilt passwd command to replace the password with a known one
manually. Replacing this password will then typically enable access
to the web-based admin console in the situation where the owner of
the device is not co-operative (see Fig. 6)
• Determination of the wireless password: commonly stored in non-
volatile memory (in our example present in the file /etc/config/
wireless); this can trivially be obtained via Terminal using the cat
command or equivalent. Fig. 4 shows the password for a wireless
access point revealed on a running router via a Serial connection
The password-related steps discussed here are highly recommended,
owing to the fact that suspects may re-use passwords. If for no other reason
than it is possible that one of the passwords used here may be relevant to
an encrypted file elsewhere in the case, these steps should be undertaken.
Fig. 6 shows the content of an example passwd and shadow file,
obtained from a running router through the use of the cat command and
a Serial connection.
Enumeration of the flash memory and identification of the file-
system volume structures is possible through the Terminal (see Fig. 7),
by exploration of the mount points. Here the /etc/fstab, and /proc/
mounts files should be examined for useful data. Furthermore, the
content of /proc/mtd is likely to be relevant. This last file commonly
contains the mount point “labels” and sizes the relevant blocks of flash
memory, which provide an investigator with meaningful intelligence as
to where the majority of data is likely stored, and which MTDBlock is
likely to contain any information of relevance. From this research’s own
empiric testing, the fstab file provides limited value but is re-
commended to be examined nonetheless. The file at /proc/mounts has
been noted to provide information about the various mounted locations
within the filesystem, in addition to the filesystem present within each.
This file has also been observed to provide useful intelligence in rela-
tion to volatile memory, in instances where the embedded device’s
RAM is in fact just another part of the onboard flash memory.
Once the memory structures and filesystem information have been
ascertained, it is possible to exfiltrate data. As these devices are typi-
cally Linux systems, standard tools such as dd, netcat, and tar are often
present. These are all that is required to extract both a physical and
filesystem image from the devices, using a properly prepared forensic
computer connected to the same network as the device which is being
investigated. Usage is typically as follows:
• Having identified the mount locations from the /proc/mounts file, the
tar command can be used to pipe this data to a compressed archive
via netcat to create a filesystem extraction. A separate extraction is
required for each mount location identified. Fig. 8 below, shows an
example tar extraction of the “root” directory of a running router.
• Having identified the flash memory structures by examining the /proc/
mtd file, the dd command can be used to pipe each MTDBlock file via
netcat to physical image files on the forensic workstation. A separate
extraction is required for each MTDBlock identified. Fig. 9 shows an
example of extracted flash memory from a router (a physical image)
The process of extracting flash memory via dd, or the running file-
system via tar, is a quick procedure to undertake. Because embedded de-
vices typically only have a very small amount of memory, this will be
achievable at-scene in a short space of time; usually a few minutes at most.
Extraction of data via dd will of course provide what is most akin to
the traditional “physical image” typically desired in more conventional,
hard drive oriented digital forensics. It should be noted however that a
physical image may not be the best solution in all cases. Certain data
may be encrypted in the physical image, but ultimately be dynamically
Fig. 3. Diagnostic information including state of networking hardware and a root shell.
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decrypted by virtue of the boot and/or other process. It is for this reason
that it is recommended to obtain both the physical (MTD) and also the
filesystem (tar) extractions as discussed; the tar image would be more
likely to contain the data in a decrypted format, possibly removing
encryption as a potential barrier to further investigation.
The forensic soundness of live examinations must be considered. It
should therefore be noted that the majority of any such terminal-based
interactions occur in RAM and therefore the footprint of changes on the
running device is minimised. That being said, because the RAM may in
fact be part of the onboard flash memory, care should be taken to run
Fig. 5. File system navigation of the connected device.
Fig. 4. Wireless SSID and password revealed through examination of the /etc/config/wireless file.
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the least number of commands as possible, in case these do result in the
overwriting of previously existing data from within memory.
To consider some specifics of potential footprints which may be left
behind, we must first consider the Linux operating system which, as
previously established, accounts for the vast majority of operating
systems present on embedded devices, such as routers. The following
locations are examples of those which may result in a data footprint
being recoverable as a result of this method of remote access:
Fig. 6. The content of the passwd and shadow files, revealing password hashes.
Fig. 7. Enumeration of mountpoints, filesystem volume information and flash memory structure.
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• Bash history. This is not normally updated as a result of a non-in-
teractive or remote shell connection.
• Authentication logs; typically located under /var/log. Should authenti-
cation be required, any failed authentications would be expected to be
recorded in the btmp file, and successful logins under the wtmp file.
Clearly such interaction is a calculated risk, however it should be
recognised that any such possible data footprints left behind by this
style of connection and interaction would be considered acceptable in
situations where remote imaging of a more “conventional” Linux
system (such as a webserver) were required through similar or the same
means (i.e. dd over netcat), and therefore could and should be con-
sidered acceptable here. It is recommended that further research can,
and should, be conducted into this area.
Examination and extraction of data from running embedded devices
naturally means that an investigator will be in close proximity to electrically
live components. Therefore, precautions should of course be taken with
regards to health and safety. Standard nitrile gloves do provide some pro-
tection against electricity; but as demonstrated by Deakin, Lee-Shrewsbury,
Hogg and Petley [24] they do not withstand high voltages or currents. It
should also be recognised that the above steps would ordinarily only be
undertaken on equipment which appears to be in correct, and safe working
order. Items at scene, which appear damaged or defective in any way should
cause the investigator to first pause and assess their safety and stability to
undergo any such further work. Should it be determined that the device is
defective or unsafe in any way, consideration should be given to seizing the
device for examination in a more controlled environment, such as a more
fully equipped digital forensic laboratory. Proper diagnostic testing,
performed by a qualified and experienced electronics engineer may be
warranted. More involved diagnosis and invasive investigation, including
the replacement of electronic components, such as is illustrated by the work
of Heckmann, Markantonakis, Naccache, and Souvignet [25] may also be
deemed proportional, especially in more serious crime investigations.
A final, but crucial point to consider during peri-scene operations is
that a sufficiently knowledgeable and technically sophisticated suspect
(i.e. one who has at minimum a sufficient level of knowledge to be able
to carry out the very techniques discussed in this research) may have
introduced counter-measures specifically designed to defeat such
methods. A risk assessment should therefore be conducted prior to
connecting to and interacting with the hardware under investigation at
all. For the typical suspect, this will of course be a non-issue. In situa-
tions where the suspect is a “hardware hacker”, or possesses significant
knowledge and/or resources of a cyber-security nature (including, of
course, organisational resources), then such techniques may be pre-
cluded. In this instance; more destructive approaches to extract the data
(such as Chip-Off), or approaches which allow for the data to be ex-
tracted with the device powered off, are recommended.
To summarise the peri-scene stage:
1. Execute appropriate “hardware hacking” techniques to gain access
to the device. Obtain a connection to the device using a developer
style connection such as UART/JTAG/GPIO
2. Obtain intelligence by interacting with the device through an es-
tablished Terminal connection. Credentials and key files can be
examined through this interface and recorded in contemporaneous
notes as appropriate
Fig. 8. “root” directory tar file, the content of the extracted data, and files present in the /etc folder present within this extraction, obtained from a running router.
Fig. 9. Flash memory blocks obtained from a running router.
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3. The device can be secured and control of the network obtained through
the use of inbuilt commands within the running operating system
4. Export information out through appropriate channels (e.g. physical dd
via netcat, filesystem acquisition using tar via netcat, EEPROM extrac-
tion, print and capture via terminal screen etc.). Performing both a fi-
lesystem and a physical image where available is highly recommended
5. Use as few commands as possible to further minimise an already
small footprint
2.3. Post-scene
The investigator will now have either a collection of tar files con-
taining the filesystem level extraction or a collection of dd files con-
taining a physical image of the flash memory (or indeed both). The tar
files are ready to examine as-is, although packaging into a logical evi-
dence file or container format is highly recommended for the purposes
of continuity and integrity.
As of writing, MTDBlocks and their highly compressed contained
filesystems (typically yaffs, squashfs, and ubifs) are not supported by any
of the mainstream digital forensic tools. Therefore it is necessary to first
extract the data from these files, so that it can be analysed. Open source
tools, such as binwalk, can be used in combination with other tools and
plugins to achieve this. This will extract the data contained within the
MTDBlocks into a subfolder and a folder structure and files will be
presented which can be inspected logically. Subsequent addition of
these extractions into a logical evidence file format, and proper pre-
servation is highly recommended. Fig. 10 highlights just how much
information is contained within these filesystems; on the left can be
seen the properties of the 9 blocks highlighted earlier, and on the right
can be seen the amount of extracted files and folders present in just the
first 4 blocks. It should be observed that there are a significant number
of files and folders present within the extracted content.
Once the blocks have had their data extracted, their content can be
examined logically, as shown in Fig. 11 below. It should again be stressed
that these files should be packaged into a logical evidence file or container
format for the purposes of preserving the integrity of the data produced.
It is important to realise that there may be nothing of value present
in certain memory blocks; indeed there simply may be no extractable
Fig. 10. Properties of the 9 MTDBlocks (left) and properties of the data extracted from within blocks 1–4 (right).
Fig. 11. Content of the squashfs filesystem extracted from MTDBlock1.
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data present. Indeed, in this example the extraction tools were run
across all 9 MTDBlocks, but only the first 4 produced any extractable
material. The content of remaining blocks can and should always be
examined manually in these instances.
To summarise the post-scene stage:
1. Extract data from acquisitions using relevant tools.
2. Extracted tar files should be packaged into a logical evidential
format for preservation and to ensure integrity of the evidence
3. Extracted dd images of the MTDBlocks require processing and ex-
traction with specialist tools to produce data which is compatible
with the current digital forensic tool suites. This extracted data, like
the tar files above, should be packaged into a logical evidential
format for preservation and to ensure integrity of the evidence
4. Once the data is extracted and secured, it can be processed, ana-
lysed, and investigated using the digital forensic investigator’s tool
suite of choice
3. Conclusions
This research has proposed a methodology which can be utilised to
increase the amount of data which can be extracted from embedded
devices for use in digital forensic investigations. This methodology
provides access to material which is normally inaccessible to the user
and also to investigators using the current standard operating proce-
dures. The benefits of pre-scene preparation, use of test devices and
firmware exploitation have also been discussed, along with an ex-
planation of methods to gain access and tools to use to extract data.
These tools are all well-established standard issue operating system
tools, which function in memory and provide a minimal footprint when
in use, thereby increasing the validity, reliability and forensic sound-
ness of their use. This research advocates use of the UART/Serial con-
nection owing to its ease of use, reliability and inexpense. Furthermore
it provides useful diagnostic information whilst performing actions,
including when using it in combination with the other techniques dis-
cussed to obtain data. Finally, once the data is extracted, this metho-
dology outlines the mechanism through which the data can be prepared
for examination using standard digital forensic tools. To conclude, the
proposed methodology has been provided in Appendix A for convenient
reference.
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Appendix A. SOP for advanced acquisition of data from embedded devices
1. Pre-scene:
I. Identify the devices present in advance of arrival if possible
II. Examination of publicly available information such as mainboard schematics/teardown guides may provide insight into connectivity to the
device, such as UART or JTAG which can be exploited to gain access
III. Conduct research on test devices if available
IV. Obtain firmware from the manufacturer. This can be used to reverse engineer data structures, file system information, passwords, and can
provide meaningful intelligence on key files in advance. Examine multiple versions of firmware if available
2. Peri-scene:
I. Execute appropriate “hardware hacking” techniques to gain access to the device. Obtain a connection to the device using a developer style
connection such as UART/JTAG/GPIO
II. Obtain intelligence by interacting with the device through an established Terminal connection. Credentials and key files can be examined
through this interface and recorded in contemporaneous notes as appropriate
III. The device can be secured and control of the network obtained through the use of inbuilt commands within the running operating system
IV. Export information out through appropriate channels (e.g. physical dd via netcat, filesystem acquisition using tar via netcat, EEPROM ex-
traction, print and capture via terminal screen etc.). Performing both a filesystem and a physical image where available is highly re-
commended
V. Use as few commands as possible to further minimise an already small footprint
3. Post-scene:
I. Extract data from acquisitions using relevant tools.
II. Extracted tar files should be packaged into a logical evidential format for preservation and to ensure integrity of the evidence
III. Extracted dd images of the MTDBlocks require processing and extraction with specialist tools to produce data which is compatible with the
current digital forensic tool suites. This extracted data, like the tar files above, should be packaged into a logical evidential format for
preservation and to ensure integrity of the evidence
IV. Once the data is extracted and secured, it can be processed, analysed, and investigated using the digital forensic investigator’s tool suite of
choice
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